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Nixon’s 1970s
For much of the first two decades after World War
II, the Cold War shaped the contours of world affairs.
American consumerism merged with Keynesian planning in the West, powering a durable yet militarized economic recovery that linked North America with Europe
and Japan, while the Soviet Union–locked in an awkward
diplomatic marriage to communist China–gravitated toward a sturdy homeostasis based on domestic austerity,
defense spending, and geopolitical opportunism. The resulting arrangement was a portrait of paradox. Cast as
ideological antipodes on the world stage, Washington
and Moscow stumbled into an expensive arms race and
a vicious set of proxy conflicts, even as they reinforced
comparable norms about geopolitical bipolarity, state-led
economic development, and cultural homogeneity.

more complex global system based on geopolitical plurality, economic decentralization, and cultural contestation.

Nixon in the World provides a series of snapshots of
the post-1960s world. The book is a study of high diplomacy and grand strategy, framed by a simple question:
how did the U.S. government respond to the challenges
of this uncertain era? With a combination of hard-nosed
realpolitik and strident amorality, editors Fredrick Logevall and Andrew Preston argue. “Rather than unrealistically demonizing its adversaries,” the United States
embraced the notion “that in an increasingly globalized
world it could no longer seal off its rivals” (p. 8). Communist countries, like the Soviet Union and China, dismissed
once as existential threats to the United States, reemerged
As readers of H-1960s know well, this status quo as viable political partners, while Germany, France, and
ended during the 1960s. Precipitated by decolonization Japan–integral parts of Washington’s postwar alliance
abroad and demographic change at home–to say noth- during the first two decades of the Cold War–found
ing of the rights revolution and America’s controversial themselves recast as mere pawns on the chessboard of
war in Vietnam–activists, academics, and politicians ev- global affairs. “Conservative in its aims” yet “revolutionerywhere began removing the “lens” of the early Cold ary in its methods,” the resulting approach transformed
War. By the end of the decade, political, social, and cul- the rules of foreign affairs, revitalizing America’s strattural assumptions once cast in static, universal terms had egy of containment while softening the logic and impligiven way to novel arguments about dependency, racism, cations of the superpower contest (p. 7). The goal, in
and imperialism. “Like balls of yarn, stable lines of post- short, was to refresh U.S. power in an age of relative dewar geopolitics came undone as people pulled at them cline.
from multiple directions,” historian Jeremi Suri explains
Nixon in the World’s individual chapters catalogue
(p. 67). The resulting upheavals not only reset the trajecthe
administration’s
successes and failures in implementtory of world politics, but also established an infinitely
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ing this “grand design.” In an attempt to explicate President Richard Nixon’s worldview, as well as his relationship with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, the
opening section looks equally at events in the domestic
and international arenas. Jussi Hanhimäki provides an
especially insightful essay about the Nixon Doctrine and
détente, connecting the administration’s elusive global
plan to the war in Vietnam, while David Greenberg, Dominic Sandbrook, and Suri advance diverging (and occasionally overlapping) interpretations of the Nixon administration’s goals and shortcomings. Parts 2 and 3
turn attention to U.S. relations in East Asia and West
Europe, tackling stories of triangulation, linkage, and
ostpolitik head-on, before shifting to the slow-moving
tragedy of Vietnam. With chapters from Francis Gavin,
Lien-Hang Nguyen, Margaret MacMillan, Michael Morgan, Mary Sarotte, and Robert Schulzinger, the sections
are predictably balanced with especially judicious explanations of U.S. nuclear strategy, West German foreign
policy, and the opening of China. Part 4 surveys crises
that erupted in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin
America between 1969 and 1977, as well as the administration’s peacetime relationships with Japan and Canada.
Angola’s civil war and OPEC’s oil embargoes are mostly
overlooked, but this section too is strong, with provocative contributions from Robert Bothwell, Mark Lawrence,
Robert McMahon, Salim Yaqub, and Thomas Zeiler.

Nixon in the World casts aside many of the polemics
that attached themselves to the thirty-seventh president
during the 1970s, and advances in their place a confident yet nuanced story about détente. On one level, the
volume is a masterful illustration of diplomatic history
as a craft. However, the volume leaves an important–
arguably the most important–question curiously underexamined: what exactly changed during the 1970s? If
Logevall and Preston’s book has a flaw, it is its reliance on
the perspective of American policy makers. While explicated with élan, the grand strategy of the Nixon administration seems detached at times from the complexities it
confronted, and the president’s “conservative” yet “revolutionary” foreign policy, chronicled in rich detail, occasionally feels aloof from the structural transformations
that actually marked the 1970s. As most historians agree,
the White House’s reconceptualization of containment
happened in an arena where assumptions about global
order–codified at New Hampshire’s Bretton Woods resort in July 1944–were giving way to new types of crossnational economic exchange, financial innovation, and
nongovernmental activism. Did détente drive or follow
these processes? Determining an answer requires jumping headlong into the contorted history of globalization–
a plunge not made by Nixon in the World. Working firmly
within the confines of political history, the book leaves
others to determine how Washington’s initiatives intersected with such structural transformations as China’s
embrace of market capitalism, OPEC’s rejection of the
West, and Africa’s descent into economic catastrophe.

The authors and editors hedge their bets in advancing a final verdict about Nixon’s tenure in the White
House. The president’s team earns generally high marks
for the Soviet and Chinese summits of 1972, as well
as the Paris Peace Accord that ended the Vietnam War
in 1973, and most contributors accept triangular diplomacy as an innovative way to extend Washington’s influence in uncertain times. However, they scoff collectively at détente, which not only “failed” to end the Cold
War but also lagged behind comparable efforts in West
Europe (p. 13). The president’s approach in the third
world is likewise lambasted, with most authors in agreement that U.S.-funded authoritarians perpetuated cycles
of conflict, instability, and brinksmanship throughout the
global South. Moreover, Nixon’s cynical nature–as problematic abroad as it was at home–sowed the seeds of an
inevitable decline, fueling an intense backlash among activists on both ends of the political spectrum who were
convinced (for very different reasons) that realpolitik
was eroding America’s moral standing in the world. The
Nixon who emerges from this contested milieu is neither
a tragic nor an evil character–merely an ambitious politician, equal parts prudent, foolish, and arrogant.

None of which is to question directly the importance of Nixon in the World. The book deserves to be
read widely. A historical consensus is emerging about
the 1970s. Dismissed once as an anomaly in the twentieth century, the tumultuous decade is reemerging as
one of the seminal pivot-points of the modern era–equal
in importance only to the 1890s and 1930s.[1] Nixon in
the World tells a story of U.S. foreign policy during this
age of upheaval, and it does so with analytical precision
and interpretive balance. To future volumes will fall the
daunting task of uncovering new questions, and recasting America’s story in an international framework.
Note
[1]. For an important recent international history
of the 1970s, see Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez
Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., The Shock of the Global:
The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2009).
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